Mubarak has not been put on trial. The National Democratic Party (NDP) is still alive and kicking despite the revolutionaries insisting that it has to be dissolved. The local councils and governors appointed by the old regime have not been replaced; editors of all the national papers, associated and hired by the old regime, remain in their positions; members of the old regime still dominate most workers’ unions and public companies; the emergency law has not been lifted and most political detainees remain in captivity.
Thursday, March 31, 2011
Repost: The Revolution's Honeymoon is Over
Mubarak has not been put on trial. The National Democratic Party (NDP) is still alive and kicking despite the revolutionaries insisting that it has to be dissolved. The local councils and governors appointed by the old regime have not been replaced; editors of all the national papers, associated and hired by the old regime, remain in their positions; members of the old regime still dominate most workers’ unions and public companies; the emergency law has not been lifted and most political detainees remain in captivity.
Monday, March 21, 2011
Repost: Controversial outcome to Saturday's Elections
Controversial Outcome to Saturday’s Elections
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| One of the latest murals cropping up throughout Egypt showing support for a secular Egypt, Christians and Muslims: One Hope, One Pain |
And yet, the outcome came to a resounding "yes" followed by concerns of the Muslim Brotherhood.
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| Another message painted on a school wall with the Christian symbol (cross) and Muslim symbol (moon) |
Source.
Friday, March 18, 2011
A Voice of the Revolutionary Youth
Tomorrow is a big day for anyone involved in the Revolution. Voting "NO" on the amendments will enable the formation of an entirely new Constitution, unprecedented in this country's recent history. Voting "yes" will allow ammendments to the present Constitution; it's a very hot debate indeed.
Here's a pic from what I've started seeing here in Hurghada, just one of many cars I saw with posters and flyers proclaiming "La2a" or "No" in Arabic.
And without further adieu, here is the posting from Amr Bassiony.
I have recently avoided offering my opinion in writing on the matrix of political and conspiracy theories that have been flooding the airwaves, Internet and offline conversations since January 25 — partly due to frustration but also because I found it rather difficult to form of a clear picture what was going on. But right now, a certain sense of clarity has hit me and some pieces of the puzzle are coming together. So I’d like to share with you what I regard as a plausible scenario.
Bear with me, it may be a little complicated and confusing at first, though I’m hoping my point will become clearer as your read your way to the end of this post.
The Plan
The National Democratic Party (NDP) has always kept the sheep in line using fear. There were only two options for us: either we have a “secular” government that will create stability and safety for us all, or we will have to accept the Muslim Brotherhood (or the “Brother Muslimhood” as our former number one intelligence man Suleiman liked to call them) and live under an Islamic government.
Now that the president is ousted, and people have woken up to more options, more freedom and a desire to create their fate, someone (and his entourage) are not happy. If I were the head of the NDP, and I wanted to prove all those “bastards from Jan25” that broke my back that they were wrong and I was right, what would I do? I’d stick to my word and fulfill the prophesy that I had once predicted.
Prophecy #1: Instability & Insecurity
On January 28, what was the first thing that this government did? Rewind back a few weeks. Remember when club-wielding vigilantes set up cordons on streets, and teary-eyed house wives called in to State TVs wailing about thugs and people breaking into their homes. Remember that horror movie? That was our government fulfilling their promise, and they did; they created widespread chaos, insecurity and instability.
And mind you, this was not a burst of instability, it’s part of a long-term plan that is meant to sustain a level insecurity that can remain for months if not years, and the following events point to that:
- Before the Military Council came in power (i.e. events left to happen by the NDP)
- Large number of prisoners released.
- Looting, widespread crime and terrorizing neighbourhoods.
- Stolen police and military uniforms and weapons.
- Destroyed economy (financial/economic security).
- Chaos within the ranks of the Interior Ministry.
- After the Military Council came in power (i.e. events that happened as the Military Council watched, possibly with their blessings)
- Shenanigan of State Security Investigations (Amn El Dawla) immediately after the resignation of Ex-Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik.
- Sectarian violence (in the presence of the military).
- The torching of Atfeeh Church by thugs causing the Christians to come out on the streets in protest.
- Christians attacked by “thugs” immediately after chanting “Allah Akbar!” (warming us up for the Bogey Monster — the Islamists?)
- Women’s march attacked by thugs.
- Thugs and military holding a joint operation to attack and arrest protesters in Tahrir and evacuate the square.
- Military attacking Coptic Christian protesters in Maspiro when their numbers dwindled.
Prophesy #2: The Bogey Monster/ “El Bo3Bo3”
The second thing we were reminded of, in a manner of speaking, through recent event was the so-called political strength and “organizational might” of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), they were the Bogey Monster, or “El Bo3bo3” if you prefer it in Arabic. The second part of the prophecy had to be fulfilled; the Islamists would take over just because they were so powerful as the NDP has always warned … or are they?
This is a much more complicated and much less obvious unfolding of events happening at the moment, so let’s collect those dots then connect the dots together.
The dots:
- Top NDP officials are not targeted. Those who were handed down travel bans, asset freeze, or were put under investigation are almost only businessmen ministers, which by comparison to some big wigs, were probably the least corrupt (if at all) of all those who were involved in government. The most powerful and corrupt (Safwat El Sherif, Fathy Sorour, Mofid Shihab, Zakareya Azmy & the Mubaraks) were excluded.
- The US officially says that it does not mind having the MB in the political scene (note that the US heavily funds our military).
- The MB becomes a legal entity and is allowed to run for major elections.
- One MB member was on the constitutional amendments committee from day 1.
- The NDP states that it will not disband, and will run in the upcoming elections.
- Aboud El Zomor is released from prison (one of the main figures in the assassination of our late president, Anwar El Sadat)
- Note that the following entities/persons are pushing to vote “NO” to the constitutional amendments & want a new constitution:
- Amr Mousa
- Ayman Nour
- Mohamed El Baradei
- Judge Hisham El Bastawisy
- Constitutional law professor Dr. Tharwat Badawy
- The Judges Club
- The Revolution Youth Coalition
- El Wafd Party
- El Ghad Party
- Your mother
- Your father
- Jesus
- … and Bhudda
- The following entities are pushing to vote “YES” on the amendments:
- The NDP
- The MB
- The Salafi Movement
- The MB officially saying they will not run for presidency, but plan on taking 30-40% of the seats in Parliament.
- If the constitutional changes are passed, then the elected parliament is entrusted in making the new constitution, and the president has no choice but to enforce it.
Connecting the dots
There is a strong connection or shared interest between the military, the NDP and the MB, who seem to be on one side, while the whole moderate and non-religious political spectrum seems to be on the other. The NDP and MB have the same common goal of voting “Yes” in the referendum (they’re both strong, have deep pockets and can mobilize supporters), and the military is either working with them or pushing them in that direction (in either case, there is “tawato2”).
On the other hand, we must face the fact that the military is helping in creating an environment where the MB have an upper hand through pushing for early parliamentary elections and refusing a presidential council.
From a political perspective, the MB is looking to control the political landscape through the parliament, not through the presidency. This is almost a disguise so they can appear to be a lesser threat that is not after taking over the country. But the fact is that it is in the best interest of the MB to have one of its own as the speaker of parliament, as that position will be equally if not more powerful than the upcoming president (in the more probable case of a parliamentary model of government). If the MB hold a relative majority in parliament (as they openly plan to do), that means that they will be entrusted with making a new constitution, giving them unprecedented control.
Also, there is seems to be a sort of acceptance towards the MB, from the US to the Military and NDP (in that order). Perhaps a deal was cut?
The NDP’s ability to control the parliament in the upcoming elections is questionable, although considering their confidence and refusal to disband, they most probably have a plan to stay in the game one way or another. I don’t want to speculate too much on this point though as it is not yet clear to me how that may happen.
On the other side of the spectrum, the opposition parties and figures are too busy trying to be president because it’s fancy, while forgetting that the next government may very well be parliamentary in nature and thus the power will lie with the entity that can control the parliament, not the president’s office. This is a major political blunder that they seem to be oblivious to at this point.
The Military: What gives?
The question remains: what does the military have to gain from this? I can argue that it’s clear and obvious. Field Marshall Mohammed Tantawy has been Mubarak’s man for decades, and there’s no reason why he should not continue to be so. If anything, he is the only reason why Mubarak can lead a quiet life in the red sea resort of Sharm El Sheikh now while we all swim in the turmoil that he has thrust us into.
The fact of the situation is that the Military is clearly not working in the favor of this revolution, and they are not listening to us so intently and responding to our demands as some have claimed. They have shown that they will torture innocent protesters (including artists) inside the Egyptian Museum, and that can’t be good, let alone those that they falsely label arrested protesters as “thugs,” and are currently facing the threat of execution alongside murderers and highway robbers.
So, if the Military isn’t working with us, does that mean they’re actively working against us? Are they perhaps working with either the MB or the NDP? Which one it is? I personally don’t have the answer … I doubt anyone does. There remains as a big question mark.
Conclusion/Speculation
Following the previous train of thought, it is rather plausible that the MB are being pushed into controlling our next government, possibly in conjunction with the NDP — with the backing of the highest ranking political officer in the military, if our fears and doubts are true.
From there, the NDP (or whoever is representing their interests at that point) can come out and tell us “we told you so” about the MB taking over, and “we are your only saviour.” We will then be expected to bow down to their command once again in order to rid ourselves from the Islamic government that we revolted and fell into. Iran, anyone?
When that happens (and the people will be fed up by then) the thugs will come back out to the ballots and the rigging will happen all over again in favor of the NDP. But this time, the people will accept it, in fact they will probably welcome it, because they have seen what the country might turn into after Mubarak and his entourage were removed, putting us straight back into the hands of the one political gang that we revolted to rid ourselves of.
Now, this is what a true counter-revolution looks like in a country like Egypt is corrupt down to the bone. We the people are on our own against all odds, against all forces working against us. Against a counter-revolution that is powerful and that is strong, manipulative and with many faces. Though the one thing that they do not understand yet, is that they cannot stand against the will of a nation.
The only way to foil this plot is to vote “NO” to the constitutional amendments. Even if the argument is not clear to you or you cannot explain the intricate details of the amendments, you can put it in this simple argument:
Dear Sir,
Here are the people who are for the amendments: the NDP, the MBs, and Salafis … and here are those who are against it: Everybody who’s for freedom and who has the country’s interests in mind. Which side do you want to be on here?
Thank you and have a good day.
Follow Amr on his Twitter @AmrBassiouny
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Egypt's Pharonic Rule
After three decades of economic progress but political paralysis, change is in the air, says Max Rodenbeck
Jul 15th 2010

TRAVELLING into Cairo, Egypt’s monster-sized but curiously intimate capital, it is hard to tell if these are the best of times or the worst. Visitors who have long known the city are in two minds. Egyptian expatriates returning home are liable to cringe at the worse-than-ever traffic, the ever-louder noise, the fervid religiosity, and what they often bemoan as a new aggressiveness that spoils their nostalgia for a sweeter, cheerier Egypt. But tourists who came here, say, 20 years ago, tend to delight in the sleeker look of the place, the surprisingly efficient and still friendly service, the far better quality and variety of goods in the markets, and the fact that some taxis now actually have functioning meters. side note: Although many taxi's now have meters, most still don't use them, or for those that do, many will double the cost and overcharge people
Both impressions are right. The new World Bank-funded, Turkish-built terminal at Cairo International airport is as blandly functional as Cincinnati’s or Stockholm’s. Gone are the sweaty officials and greasy baggage handlers of yore, the taxi touts and shoving crowds. A businessman arriving here may be whisked in an Egyptian-built car to the cigar bar at one of Cairo’s dozens of swish hotels—perhaps one at City Stars, a commercial complex on the scale and in the style of Las Vegas. Or perhaps to another fancy hotel in one of the burgeoning gated exurbs in the desert, surrounded by the lavishly watered greenery of a designer golf course. There, the talk will be of beach houses and yachts on the Red Sea, of hot stocks on the Cairo exchange, and of Egypt’s delightfully low-cost labour. which would then encompass less than a third of Egyptian society. Egypt's social strata is one where the idiom "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer" couldn't be more true. Rich upper class Egyptians have more money than they know what to do with, while for many in the lower class, finding enough cash to feed a family for a week (let alone a month) is a far greater concern .
A less lucky traveller, however, might instead see these things as most Egyptians do: in the giant backlit billboards that clutter Cairo’s roadsides and rooftops, vividly flaunting the unattainable. The consumer paradise they display, with perfect hair, light-skinned children and men in pinstripe suits, stands in stark contrast to the harried, shuffling crowds below. Such sights will probably be accompanied by an earful of complaint from the driver stuck in a jam: about corrupt traffic cops and the absurd impossibility of feeding and schooling the kids on $150 a month, but above all about politics, the staple of all Middle Eastern conversationalists.
Political talk in Egypt has always been acidly cynical, but now a new bitterness has crept in (aided in no part by the increasing access to Internet that more Egyptian youth now have). This has not been prompted by any change from above, since little has really changed in Egyptian politics since President Hosni Mubarak came to office 29 years ago. The sour mood is informed instead by the contrast between rising aspirations and enduring hardships; by a growing sense of alienation from the state; and by the unease of anticipation as the end of an era inevitably looms ever closer.
It is not surprising that Egyptians should feel rather like driftwood on the Nile, accelerating towards one of the great river’s cataracts. Their current pharaoh is 82 years old, visibly ailing, and has no anointed successor. Most of his people have known no other leader. The vast majority have grown so inured to having no say in the course of events that the reflex is to float patiently rather than try to paddle. Parliamentary elections are scheduled for November this year and presidential ones for September next. As usual, few citizens are likely to take part. They will watch from the sidelines and accept the preordained results with grim humour.
Nevertheless, the expectation of a seismic shift is almost tangible in the air, and not just because of Mr Mubarak’s health. Egyptians may be renowned for being politically passive, but the rising generation is very different from previous ones. It is better educated, highly urbanised, far more exposed to the outside world and much less patient. Increasingly, the whole structure of Egypt’s state, with its cumbersome constitution designed to disguise one-man rule, its creaky centralised administration, its venal, brutal and unaccountable security forces and its failure to deliver such social goods as decent schools, health care or civic rights, looks out of kilter with what its people want.

For some time Egyptian commentators have been noting resemblances between now and the years before Egypt’s previous seismic shift. That happened in 1952, when a group of army officers rolled their tanks up to King Farouk’s palaces and tossed him out. The coup was wildly popular at the time. It had followed a period of drift and growing tension, marked by strikes, assassinations, riots and intrigues between Communists, Muslim Brothers and the king. Egypt was thriving economically, but the spoils flowed mostly to a cosmopolitan elite that was out of tune with the street. It had a functioning democracy, but ever-squabbling politicians seemed unable to get things done. To general chagrin they could not shake off the lingering influence of Britain, whose soldiers refused to budge from the Suez Canal where they had been encamped since 1882.
The officers’ coup replaced this genteel but dysfunctional constitutional monarchy with one-party rule, fronted by a strongman and backed by secret police, with the tanks idling nearby. Republican Egypt became a model for other Arab dictatorships and forced wrenching changes at home. Its promises of free health and education, land reform and jobs in state factories and offices did lift millions out of misery to mere poverty. The ideology of pan-Arabism trumpeted by the coup leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, gave Egyptians a place of pride in the world, even if his boldness brought ruinous wars in Yemen and against Israel.
Six decades and four presidents on, the revolutionary regime has metamorphosed into one that encourages private business and allows for some pluralism. Yet it looks to many Egyptians like a waning dynasty—the 45th in the long line of houses that have ruled the world’s most enduring nation since 3000BC. Its promises are largely in tatters. Schools and hospitals are indeed free to enter, but they are grim, bare, crowded places where getting learning or treatment requires cash that many still do not have. The lower middle class of army officers and bureaucrats who rose in the revolution have joined the gentry they were supposed to have ousted, adopted their haughty ways and now share Egypt’s spoils with them. The poor still queue for government-subsidised bread and must scrimp and save to buy a pair of shoes.
The government’s plan to perpetuate itself in office, via the traditional electoral rigmarole, is likely to go ahead. Predictions of change in Egypt have almost always proved wrong; generally it bumbles along much as usual. This time may just be different. The country now faces three main possibilities. It could go the way of Russia and be ruled by a new strongman from within the system. It might, just possibly, go the way of Iran, and see that system swept away in anger. Or it could go the way of Turkey, and evolve into something less brittle and happier for all concerned.



